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Abstract 
The German social democratic party initiated in 2003 the greatest overhaul of labour market 
legislation in decades, severely cutting unemployment benefits and slashing employment 
protection legislation. How can we explain this radical policy shift? This paper will present a 
counter-intuitive answer, arguing that the SPD implemented the reforms because of electoral 
interests. The rationale is two-fold and relates to changes in labour market policy supply and 
policy demand. First, the German social democrats strategically adjusted their labour market 
policy supply, seeking to maximise their office pay-offs by appealing to the median voter in a 
competitive political space. Second, the shift in policy-supply is also a reaction to changes in 
labour market policy-demand, with crucial segments of the electorate turning more 
favourably to welfare state retrenchment. This shift disproportionally benefited the 
conservative CDU and liberal FDP and forced the SPD to reposition itself in the party 
landscape.  
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What's left of the left?  
Partisanship and the political economy of 
labour market reform: why has the social 
democratic party in Germany liberalised 
labour markets? 
"Modernise or die" 
Gerhard Schröder (2003) 
 
Introduction 
When the social democratic government in Germany pushed through 
substantive labour market reforms in 2003-2005, the surprise was two-fold. 
First, reform in the "frozen landscape" (Esping-Andersen 1996: 24) of 
European welfare states contradicted long-standing claims about political 
gridlock (Pierson 2001b). Second, the fact that a social democratic 
government1 liberalised labour markets – acting against the interests of its 
traditional worker constituency – was most puzzling. Scholarly consensus 
suggested that in times of "permanent austerity" (Pierson 2001a), social 
democratic governments would at least defend the status quo. Contrary to 
these firm convictions, the SPD initiated the greatest overhaul of labour 
market legislation in decades, severely cutting unemployment benefits and 
                                                        
1This paper uses the terms social democratic and socialist interchangeably to denote the 
principal reformist party of the left in accordance with standard practice in the literature (Simoni 
2013). 
What's left of the left? 
  6 
slashing employment protection legislation (see, e.g., Eichhorst 2007, Hassel 
and Schiller 2010, Hinrichs 2010, Leaman 2009). 
This unavoidably raises the question why the social democratic government 
in Germany shifted from demand-side to supply-side labour market policies 
against the predictions of mainstream partisan theory (see, e.g., Boix 1998, 
Garrett 1998, Hibbs 1977, Rueda 2007). 
Most existing studies emphasise the role of ideas (Stiller 2010), discourse 
(Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein 2007) or policy-learning (Fleckenstein 2011, 
Kemmerling and Bruttel 2006). The downside of these micro-approaches, as 
Vis (2010: 130) notes, is that they cannot “travel across countries and over 
time.” A recurring macro-theory sounds like a female first name: TINA, i.e. 
there is no alternative for the left but to liberalise labour markets. Yet, apart 
from stylised macroeconomic arguments, it generally does not say why social 
democratic governments have no alternative. And, by all evidence, many left-
wing governments at that time, e.g. in France, did not liberalise labour 
markets despite supposedly having no alternative (Malo et al. 2000). 
This paper will present a counter-intuitive answer, arguing that the German 
social democratic government implemented the reforms precisely because of 
electoral interests. The rationale is two-fold and relates to changes in labour 
market policy supply and policy demand. First, the German social democrats 
strategically adjusted their labour market policy supply (Kitschelt 1994, 1999, 
2001). With the move to the centre, the SPD sought to maximise its office pay-
offs by appealing to the median voter (Downs 1957). In contrast to France, 
where the PS was confronted with intense competition on the left 
(Goldhammer and Ross 2011: 156), the SPD enjoyed more leeway to shift to 
the centre (Picot 2009: 155). Second, the shift in policy-supply is also a reaction 
to changes in labour market policy-demand, with crucial segments of the 
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electorate turning more favourably to welfare state retrenchment (Picot 2009). 
This shift disproportionally benefited the conservative CDU and liberal FDP 
and forced the SPD to reposition itself in the party landscape. 
A full discussion of how the political gridlock in Germany has been overcome 
would require a more in-depth study of the German political economy (for a 
discussion of the interplay of coalition dynamics, corporatism and federalism 
see Hassel and Schiller 2010). The aim of this paper is  narrower: it focuses on 
the strategic options available to the social democratic party and complements 
conventional ideational explanations emphasising  Chancellor Schröder's 
leadership. 
To make the case for the above argument, the paper will put the following 
hypothesis to an empirical test: 
H1: Office-seeking social democratic parties liberalise labour markets if it 
is in their electoral interest. 
What would we expect to see if we were right? Office-seeking social 
democratic parties will liberalise labour markets, i.e. pivot towards the 
median voter (centripetal competition), if they hope to win more electoral 
support in the centre than lose on the left2 or become the pivotal player in the 
coalition bargaining (Kitschelt 2001). When facing strong left-wing 
competition, they shift to the left to quash rival parties (oligopolistic 
competition). To test this claim, we will update Kitschelt's (1994) spatial 
mapping of party competition with data from the Chapel Hill Experts Survey 
[CHES] (Hooghe et al. 2010). Applied to the cases at hand, we expect weak 
electoral competition on the left in Germany and strong left competition in 
France. Additionally, social democratic governments pivot to the centre only 
under the catalyst of shifting policy demand, leading to a slide in electoral 
                                                        
2See Przeworski 1985, Przeworski and Sprague 1986 for early work on electoral trade-offs. 
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support. Hence, we expect to see a pro-retrenchment shift in public opinion in 
Germany, but not in France. 
The hypothesis seems easily falsifiable in the light of the SPD's electoral defeat 
in 2005. Yet, the SPD performed significantly better on Election Day than in 
polls prior to the Hartz reforms, largely because of rising economic policy 
approval ratings (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2012). While losing the 
chancellorship, the SPD prevented an outright conservative majority and 
retained some executive power in a grand coalition. Hence, the reforms were 
electorally more successful than a cursory reading would suggest. 
This paper synthesises recent advances in the partisanship literature. To this 
effect, it proposes a new categorisation of partisanship theories. In the 
following, this paper will show that theories we classified as “static models” 
of partisan politics are contingent on the assumption of social democratic 
governments pursuing only working class preferences (see, e.g., Boix 1998, 
Hibbs 1977). “Hybrid models” acknowledge that preferences of the left-
leaning electorate might change, consequently shifting the incentives for 
social democratic governments (Rueda 2007). Finally, “dynamic models” 
(Kitschelt 1994, 1999, 2001; Picot 2012) also allow for changing workers' 
preferences. More importantly, they argue that social democratic parties 
might shift strategies independently of their traditional electorate's 
preferences. 
The remainder of this paper will be organised as follows. Section I will review 
the three strands of the partisanship literature. Section II will discuss the 
Hartz reforms in Germany in contrast to the Aubry laws in France. Section III 
will challenge the explanatory power of static and hybrid partisanship 
models. Section IV will develop the argument. Finally, section V will extend 
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the model to similar cases of social democratic labour market reforms in 
Denmark and the Netherlands. 
 
I. Partisanship and labour market policies 
The partisanship literature is voluminous (for an overview, see Häusermann 
et al. 2013).3 This paper suggests conceptualising the existing theories in three 
distinct categories, which then will be tested against the empirical 
observations. We will discuss first (1.1) traditional partisan theories, before 
turning to (1.2) hybrid models which have contributed to a more nuanced 
understanding of insider versus outsider preferences and their impact on 
social democratic labour market policy-making. Finally, (1.3) this paper 
discusses dynamic models which introduce party competition and changing 
policy demand into the equation. 
 
1.1 Static partisan theories 
Partisan business cycle theory predicts parties to implement reforms 
strategically, catering to their constituents' preferences. Under a stable Phillips 
curve, Hibbs (1977) demonstrated that social democratic parties are willing to 
accept higher levels of inflation to achieve lower levels of unemployment. 
Hence, left-wing governments are expected to fine-tune labour markets with 
Keynesian demand stimuli or expansionary monetary policy.   
                                                        
3Therefore, this paper will focus on main contributions dealing with party politics in a narrow 
sense, investigating how "party systems and party competition affect social protection that 
people get" (Picot 2012: 1). This is why broader approaches, for instance Häusermann's (2010) 
theory based on coalition-building across parties, trade unions and employer associations will 
not be considered. 
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Keynesian demand-management and easy monetary policies came under 
scrutiny for their failure to alleviate the sclerotic economic conditions in the 
1970s.  The literature argued that a central prerequisite for this policy is the 
consent of the labour movement to moderate wage rises in line with inflation 
and productivity gains. Olson (1982) argued that this can be achieved by an 
encompassing and centrally organised union movement. Building on this 
work, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) plotted the optimal level of wage 
bargaining as a hump-shaped curve: either the wage bargaining takes place at 
the national level with encompassing trade unions, or at the individual firm 
level. In both cases, trade unions have an incentive to keep wage demands in 
line with inflation and productivity gains in order to preserve their members' 
employment.  In a nutshell, expansionary demand-management policies will 
only be sustainable in social democratic corporatist regimes (Garrett and 
Lange 1991, Scharpf 1991), which are able to offset the costs of expansionary 
demand-management policies favoured by social democratic policy-makers. 
While it is true that both the left and the right have resorted in recent times 
primarily to supply-side policies, this does not imply that these are the same 
regardless of partisan preferences. On the contrary, Boix (1998:11) argues that 
“partisan preferences have a key impact on the selection of policies designed 
to shape the supply-side of the economy.” In Boix' model, social democratic 
governments are expected to invest in human capital formation to fight 
unemployment. Conservative governments are expected to drive down the 
reservation wage by reducing unemployment benefits. 
1.2 Hybrid partisan theories 
Rueda (2006, 2007) and his co-authors (Pontusson and Rueda 2010, Pontusson 
et al. 2002) have contributed to a more nuanced understanding of partisanship 
and social democratic labour market policies, distinguishing between insider 
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and outsider preferences. Whereas insiders are concerned about employment 
security, outsiders care about unemployment. Consequently, insider favour 
stricter employment protection legislation (EPL) which makes firing harder, 
but potentially deters hiring. This obviously runs counter the interests of 
outsiders seeking an employment. Also, outsiders would disproportionally 
benefit from active labour market policies (ALMP). This difference in interests 
explains the strategic behaviour of left-wing governments. Positing that 
“social democratic parties have strong incentives to consider insiders their 
core constituency”, Rueda (2007: 2) contends that they are “associated with 
high levels of employment protection legislation but not with labour market 
policies.” 
To some extent, Rueda's model is similar to static partisan models in that it 
considers workers (insiders) as the social democrats' core constituency.4 This 
gives insiders leverage on social democratic policy-making. Yet, in contrast to 
static models, Rueda allows for changing insider preferences, which in turn 
impacts on the strategy of social democratic governments.  When do insider 
preferences change? Essentially when insiders become more like outsiders. 
Two variables determine the convergence or divergence of insider-outsider 
interests: the level of employment protection and corporatism. First, high 
levels of unemployment vulnerability, equivalent to low levels of EPL, are 
likely to align the interests of insiders and outsiders. In other words, if job 
security is low, social democratic governments are less exposed to insider 
pressure and hence more likely to pursue pro-outsider policies. In this case, 
social democratic governments will spend more on ALMP and liberalise the 
labour market. 
Second, Rueda (2007: 3) argues that corporatism magnifies the effects of 
insider-outsider differences on policy-makers. Because of their central 
                                                        
4Yet, he draws opposite conclusions concerning ALMP compared to Boix (1998). 
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involvement in industrial relations, Rueda considers unions as key players in 
determining labour market policies of social democratic parties. 
Consequently, social democratic governments are more likely to produce pro-
insider policies "when they are subjected to pro-insider pressure from unions” 
(Rueda 2007: 29). 
 
1.3 Dynamic partisan theories 
Dynamic models also acknowledge changing preferences of the social 
democratic electorate. In contrast to hybrid models, however, they drop the 
assumption of social democrats mechanically following the preferences of 
their traditional electorate. Rather, dynamic models postulate office-seeking 
social democratic parties to deviate from their traditional electorate if it helps 
to secure an electoral majority. Hence, they introduce dynamic party 
competition models (Kitschelt 1994) and look at changing policy demand in 
the overall electorate to account for changes in social democratic policy 
supply (Picot 2012). 
Ever since Kitschelt's seminal study on the transformation of European social 
democracy (1994), it has become standard practice to represent the space of 
party competition in two dimensions (Hooghe et al. 2002). The horizontal axis 
displays parties' positions on an economic (socialist vs. capitalist) left-right 
scale, and the vertical axis on a value-based (libertarian/green/alternative vs. 
traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) scale. 
 
 
 
Patrick Lunz 
13   
 
Figure 1: Competitive space for social democracy  
 
Source: Kitschelt (1994: 32) 
Prior to the 1970s, party competition ran along the traditional 
socialist/capitalist axis. In post-industrial capitalist democracies, this axis has 
been tilted upwards (see Figure 1). The new main axis of voter distributions 
therefore runs along a left-libertarian/right-authoritarian divide. Hence, 
Kitschelt (1994: 32) argues that "social democratic parties were well advised to 
shift towards more (i) libertarian and (ii) more capitalist positions [from SD1 to 
SD2].”5 The story does not stop here. If we examine, starting at SD2, the 
strategic choices available to social democrats, there are two options: either a 
shift along the new axis towards a more left-libertarian (SD2') or centrist (SD2'') 
position. 
Which variable determines whether social democrats pivot towards the left or 
to the right? Kitschelt (1994: 34) argues this depends on their electoral 
objectives which in turn are shaped by their competitors' positions. Three 
electoral strategies emerge. First, policy-seeking social democrats pursue the 
preferences of their constituents regardless of electoral consequences. Even 
                                                        
5For a more detailed elaboration on the political-economic, electoral and party organisation 
dilemmas facing social democrats, see Kitschelt (1999: 322). 
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following crushing defeats, they remain firmly anchored on the left. Because 
social democrats need to hold office to implement their preferred policies, 
pure policy-seeking strategies have very little appeal and were gradually 
abandoned.6 
Second, vote-seeking social democrats seek to maximise their vote share (Cox 
1990). Yet, votes have little intrinsic value but serve the purpose of gaining 
executive power. A party might well gain the highest number of votes without 
being able to form a government, because a coalition of losers bars the way. 
From a rational choice perspective, parties cherish votes but prefer power. 
Third and more likely, social democrats seek to increase their chances of 
holding executive office by capturing "the pivotal voter in the dimension of 
party competition, [so] no government coalition can be formed against it” 
(Kitschelt 1994: 34). Two strategies allow achieving this electoral objective. 
First, social democrats might pivot straight toward the centre (centripetal 
competition). Yet, while this might increase their bargaining position, left-
libertarian voters might shift their allegiance to more radical parties. In this 
case, social democrats first opt to squeeze left-wing competitors (oligopolistic 
competition), before pivoting toward the centre. 
Contrary to what static partisan theories suggest, social democrats in most 
countries are not overly concerned with their traditional electorate (policy-
seeking), but pursue office-seeking strategies (Schumacher 2012). These 
strategies might coincide in specific party competition landscapes with policy-
seeking (e.g. France), but office-seeking is the dominant strategy. Hence, 
dynamic partisanship models contend that social democratic parties are 
responsive to shifting labour market policy demand of the whole electorate. 
                                                        
6The SPD's programmatic change was adopted in the Bad Godesberger Program (1959) 
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Considering the variation of social policies across countries, it has been 
hypothesised that varying support for the welfare state accounts for political 
change (Giger 2012, Schmidt 2000). In his work on the segmentation of social 
policy preferences, Picot (2009, 2012) identifies for some countries a shift in 
labour market policy demand towards retrenchment. He argues that this 
subtle demand shift can account for fundamental reforms where social 
democratic parties have to adjust their policy supply to preserve their 
electoral chances. Therefore, policy-demand is likely to be a crucial variable 
determining labour market policies of social democratic governments. 
This paper has mapped out three strands of partisans approaches to labour 
market reforms. The following section will unfold the labour market reforms 
in Germany, which will then be tested in section III against the theoretical 
expectations developed in this section. 
 
II. Labour market reforms in Germany and France 
This section will start with (2.1) a brief theoretical justification of the case 
selection. Then, we will turn to a comparative case study of the labour market 
reforms (2.2) in Germany and (2.3) in France. 
 
2.1. Case selection 
For the purpose of this paper, we argue that the labour market reforms in 
Germany and France are reasonably suited candidates for a comparative case 
study using the method of difference. Both countries are classified in the 
Esping-Andersen (1990) framework as conservative, Bismarckian welfare 
What's left of the left? 
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states (for an update, see Palier 2010); both countries are open economies 
exposed to similar macroeconomic constraints; both countries share the euro 
and the strings attached in terms of monetary and fiscal policy; both countries 
were governed at approximately the same time by left-wing governments7. 
The labour market situation in both countries was broadly similar with high 
levels of unemployment of around 10 %.  Despite these similarities, the policy 
outcome is completely different. While the SPD implemented wide-reaching 
labour market reforms, the French PS intensified labour market rigidities 
(Brandt et al. 2005). 
Admittedly, the political systems in both countries are quite different - 
notably the electoral system (proportional representation in Germany versus 
majority voting in France). Yet, Schumacher (2011: chapter 3 and 4) argues 
that the electoral system does not have a major impact on the parties' electoral 
strategies. The differences in the party structure and system8 are endogenous 
to the argument, i.e. we argue that the difference here can account for the 
different policy outcome. 
The labour market reforms in Germany and France matter for three reasons. 
First, because of their magnitude: contrary to previous piece-meal attempts, 
these reforms have brought about fundamental change; second, because of 
their ideological impact on the left. While the Hartz reforms are the poster 
child of the new left's “third way” (for the intellectual foundation see Giddens 
1998, Hombach 2000, Schröder and Blair 1999; for a discussion see Clasen and 
Clegg 2004), the French reforms stand for a traditional view of left 
government (Clift 2001, Hayden 2006). Third and finally, they matter because 
of their legacy. The Hartz reforms are praised for regaining Germany's 
                                                        
7In Germany, the SPD coalesced with the Greens; in France, the PS with an array of left-leaning 
splinter parties, including the Greens and the PCF. In both cases, the social democrats occupied 
all ministries relevant for the reforms. 
8Consolidated party system in Germany versus a fragmented system in France 
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international competitiveness (for a critical discussion see Carlin and Soskice 
2009) and enjoy broad political support. On the contrary, the French 35-hours 
week is ever since its introduction at the heart of the left-right political 
cleavage. 
 
2.2. Labour market reforms in Germany 2003-2005 
In order to understand the magnitude of the German labour market reforms, 
we will provide a brief summary of the main legislative changes before 
tracking their impact on key OECD labour market indicators9. 
Table 1 summarises the four waves of labour market reforms from 2003-2005, 
Hartz I-IV. After a timid start in the first term, the Schröder II government set 
in motion an ambitious reform agenda. 
Table 1: Overview of Hartz reforms 
Hartz I Deregulation of temporary agency work 
Tightening the criteria of reasonable work and the sanction regime 
Hartz II Introduction of mini-job scheme 
Hartz III Reduction of the regulatory density of the Social Code III 
Tightening the sanction regime 
Hartz IV Introduction of ALG II 
Source: Adapted from Fleckenstein (2011: 88) 
 
The reforms' leitmotiv is job creation by cutting down barriers for temporary 
work. Also, they aimed at reducing the reservation wage by tightening 
unemployment benefits and widening the criteria of job-offers unemployed 
are expected to accept. If job-seekers reject "reasonable" offers, benefits will be 
                                                        
9All labour market data stem from the OECD database, accessible at www.stats.oecd.org. 
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cut. The most salient piece of reform is undoubtedly Hartz IV which merged 
unemployment and social assistance schemes. The duration of the regular 
unemployment benefits was shortened from up to 36 months to 12 months. 
After this period, job-seekers are shifted to Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II) 
benefits. Besides the lower rates, ALG II benefits are - contrary to the former 
social assistance - means-tested, taking personal assets like savings or real-
estate are taken into account. The objective of this measure consists in driving 
down unemployment expenditure, but also giving additional incentives to the 
unemployed to speed up their job search (activation). 
In line with the OECD Jobs Strategy (1994), the Hartz reforms aim to render 
the supply-side of labour markets more flexible. The reforms' impact on key 
labour market indices is significant. 
Figure 2: EPL in Germany 1998-2005 
 
Source: OECD (2012) 
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In overall terms, the OECD EPL index10 has decreased from 2.34 points in 2001 
to 2.12 points in 2005. Interestingly, employment protection for regular 
employment has risen from 2.7 to 3.0 points over the same period. Hence, the 
adjustment was borne by temporary employment, whose protection was 
slashed from 2.0 to 1.3 points. The deregulation of temporary agency work 
contained in Hartz I has contributed to this net decline. Combined with the 
introduction of mini-job schemes, this reform has led to a rising share of 
temporary employment, which increased from 12.7% to 14.5%. 
Simultaneously, unemployment benefits as a share of previous earnings have 
dropped from 25.7% to 23.7%. Consequently, Germany is among the top 
performers in an OECD review of labour market reform intensity (Brandt et 
al. 2005: 56). 
 
2.3. Labour market reforms in France 1998-2000 
Analogous to the discussion of the Hartz reforms, this section will summarise 
the main aspects of the French reforms before assessing their impact on key 
OECD labour market indicators. 
In contrast to the liberal supply-side reforms in Germany, the French reforms 
restricted labour supply by cutting the statutory weekly working time from 39 
to 35 hours. The rationale was to induce additional labour demand, or at least 
to share the “pie” of work between more employees, thereby reducing 
unemployment11. The reform was introduced by two legislative acts. The first, 
Aubry I, enacted the 35-hour week. What is more, it provided incentives for 
social partners to engage in sector-wide and firm-level negotiations on 
                                                        
10The EPL index is calculated on a 0-6 scale, where 0 signifies weak and 6 strong EPL. 
11Note that the conceptualisation of employment as a pie to be shared among potential 
employees is highly contentious issue among economists. 
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working time reduction (Hayden 2006). The second law, Aubry II, essentially 
responded to concerns voiced by the employer federation, MEDEF. It 
introduced some degree of flexibility concerning the distribution of working 
time across the year. Also, it watered down the requirements for firms to 
benefit from payroll tax cuts. Instead of sticking to the conditionality of job 
creation introduced in Aubry I, firms needed to reach a 35-hour agreement 
and simply express a "commitment to creating or saving jobs" (Hayden 2006: 
509). Yet, the working time reduction as the cornerstone of the reforms 
remained untouched (Eichhorst 2007). 
The reforms had a very measured effect on the main OECD labour market 
indices, because they primarily concerned the statutory working time and 
touched employment protection only marginally. 
Figure 3: EPL in France 1997-2002 
 
Source: OECD (2012) 
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Overall EPL remained essentially stable at 2.8 points, with a slight increase to 
2.9 in 2001. While the protection of regular contracts increased by 0.1 points to 
2.4, temporary contracts stayed at constantly high levels at 3.6 points. 
Contrary to Germany, temporary employment as a share of total employment 
diminished during this period from 15.5 to 14.5%. In the absence of reforms in 
line with the OECD job strategy, France is placed in the bottom tier of labour 
market reform intensity (Brandt et al. 2005: 56). 
The reduction of the weekly working time by four hours while maintaining 
salaries would have added up to an immediate increase in unit-labour-costs of 
around 11% (Eichhorst 2007). This would obviously have had devastating 
effects on the international competitiveness of French industries. In order to 
offset these costs, the French government offered substantive pay-roll cuts. 
These measures come with a hefty price-tag. According to recent estimates, 
the Aubry laws cost the government per year € 21.8 billion (Sénat 2011). 
The German and French labour market reforms could not have been more 
different in terms of scope, direction and impact. The next two sections will 
test the empirical observations of the labour market reforms against the 
expectations of the different strands of partisanship developed in the 
literature review. 
 
III. Testing the explanatory power of competing theories 
This section will test the explanatory power of static and hybrid partisanship 
models developed in section I for the labour market reforms in Germany and 
France. When discussing the theories, we need to ascertain whether they are 
(i) consistent with the observations in Germany and France and (ii) allow 
explaining the divergent outcomes. 
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3.1. Static partisan theories 
The discussion of the reforms' impact on key labour market indicators will be 
confronted with the expectations drawn from traditional partisan literature 
both in regards supply-side theories (Boix 1998). As we will see, neither the 
German, nor the French case fit with the predictions of the literature. The 
most striking difference between the German and French reforms is the 
dichotomy between demand (France) and supply-side reforms (Germany). In 
France, the reduction of the statutory working time is nominally a supply-side 
reform, but designed to stimulate labour demand. As discussed in the 
literature review, demand-side policies require in the Olson (1982) model 
encompassing labour movements to keep wage increases under control. This 
is not the case in France, where only 8% of the workforce was unionised in 
1998. However, the French wage-bargaining structure fits better the criterion 
of decentralisation set out in the Calmfors and Driffil (1988) model. The 
OECD employment outlook (2004) describes the French system as 
significantly decentralised. 
In sum, France introduced generously subsidised supply-side reforms, 
amounting to thinly veiled labour market demand-side policies; and this 
despite weak corporatism. In Germany, expansive demand-management, 
though theoretically feasible according to Olson (1982) and Calmfors and 
Driffil (1988), was ruled out by fiscal constraints. 
Boix (1998) posited that left-wing governments would conduct supply-side 
reforms in line with their traditional constituents' preferences. In his model, 
conservative governments are expected to stimulate employment by reducing 
the reservation wage, while social democratic governments invest in human 
capital formation. 
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In view of the reforms described in section II, this paper questions the 
explanatory power of this theory. Boix' theory can account for the French 
reforms. Yet, contrary to Boix' model, the German social democratic 
government implemented reforms closer to the predicted preferences of 
conservative governments, shortened unemployment benefits and put 
pressure on job-seekers to speed up their search. Also, it does not give an 
explanation as to why the reforms happened in Germany and not in France. 
 
3.2. Hybrid partisan theories 
Are the experiences in Germany and France consistent with Rueda's model? 
The evidence presented in section II suggests that the Hartz reforms run 
counter to Rueda's predictions. 
In Germany, the overall strictness of EPL has decreased. Admittedly, insiders 
have been touched only at the margins; their employment protection has even 
increased against the trend. However, the sharp reduction in the duration of 
unemployment benefits might be of concern to insiders. Also, the dualisation 
of the labour market puts pressure on insider wages. All in all, insiders have 
reasons to be worried about too flexible labour markets. Hence, it does "seem 
clear that insiders also lost in the reform" (Palier and Thelen 2010:137). 
On outsiders, the impact is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, outsiders 
had to bear the full burden of EPL reduction: across the OECD, Germany 
displays one of the lowest levels of temporary EPL. On the other hand, it was 
arguably the flexibilisation of temporary employment which allowed 
outsiders to access employment in the first place. Once in employment, 
former outsiders can learn new skills, raising their chances of gaining 
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permanent employment. Hence, outsiders benefit most of the reforms in the 
boom-cycle, but carry the burden of adjustment in the bust-cycle.   
Concerning expenditure on ALMP, the Hartz legislation contains measures 
like compulsory training for job-seekers likely to increase spending on ALMP. 
Yet, OECD (2012) data shows no increase in ALMP expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP. However, there is also no significant decrease in ALMP as 
Rueda’s model predicts. 
In France, insider interests were bolstered by a slight increase in EPL of 
permanent contracts. Also, the reduction in weekly working hours with 
constant wages clearly benefits insiders, equalling an 11% real wage increase. 
The impact on outsider interests largely depends on job creation. Proponents 
of the Aubry laws estimate that 300.000 jobs were created, while critics argue 
they had a detrimental effect on unemployment in the long run (for an 
overview, see Roger et al. 2004). If the Aubry laws have helped to bring 
outsiders into permanent employment, then outsiders have also benefited. On 
the contrary, if the reforms increased rigidities and made hiring more difficult, 
then outsiders have drawn the shorter straw. Thus, France broadly fits 
Rueda's expectations. 
Does the model explain why the retrenchment happened in Germany but not 
in France? Rueda’s model takes into account changing preferences of social 
democratic voters. Have insider and outsider interests converged in Germany, 
but not in France? First, the initial level of EPL has a strong impact on the 
interest formation of insiders. If job insecurity is high, then the distinction 
between insiders and outsiders will become blurred. Consequently, the thrust 
of insider-lobbying on social democratic governments is weakened. Looking 
at the data, this reasoning fails to explain why the social democratic 
government in Germany has enacted reforms and France did not. According 
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to the OECD EPL index, German employees have enjoyed at the outset of the 
reforms roughly the same level of employment protection as their French 
colleagues (see Figures 2 and 3 above). 
The second parameter determining the strategy of a left-leaning government 
is corporatism. In Rueda's insider-outsider framework, high levels of 
corporatism are considered to increase insider pressure on social democratic 
governments. In order to explain the reforms in Germany and the absence of 
reforms in France, we would need to see for example high levels of union 
density in France and low union density in Germany. Yet, the contrary is the 
case: in 2000, membership in trade unions in France stood at a meagre 8% 
compared to 24.6% in Germany. The same is true for the aggregate Hicks and 
Kenworthy (1998) corporatism index, where Germany (0.76) displays a 
considerably higher score than France (0.36). Hence, if Rueda's model was 
correct, then the reforms should have happened in France and not in 
Germany. 
To summarise, Rueda’s model gives a fairly correct explanation of the reform 
outcomes in France, but less so for Germany. Also, the model is overstretched 
when it comes to explain the reasons for the different reform outcomes. This 
is because Rueda's argument hinges on the assumption that social democratic 
governments consider insiders as their core constituency. Häusermann et al 
(2013) point out that this claim receives hardly any empirical justification. In 
contrast, this paper contends that the electoral strategy of social democratic 
parties is more nuanced: under certain circumstances, social democrats might 
turn more responsive to the interests of outsiders even to the detriment of 
insiders. This is because office-seeking social democratic parties, like the 
German SPD or the French PS not necessarily seek to promote the interests of 
their traditional constituency, but to build a majority-winning coalition to get 
into government. 
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This section has tested the German and French labour market reforms against 
the theoretical expectations of static and hybrid partisan theories. Yet, the 
German labour market reforms remain as puzzling as before. The following 
section will develop my argument of electorally-motivated social democratic 
labour market reforms. 
 
IV. Dynamic partisan theories: Explaining labour market 
reform 
Having discarded competing explanations, we now turn to the assessment of 
the research hypothesis. Because of the great number of existing qualitative 
studies (see, e.g. Fleckenstein 2011, Stiller 2010), and for a better generalisation 
of the argument, this paper will analyse primarily quantitative evidence. As 
for the previous discussion of static and hybrid partisanship models, this 
section needs to ascertain whether dynamic partisanship theories are (i) 
consistent with the observations in Germany and France; and (ii) allow to 
explain the divergent outcomes. 
The independent variables this paper examines are (4.1) the political space of 
party competition and (4.2) changes in labour market policy demand. If the 
hypothesis holds true, we expect to find evidence that the social democratic 
government in Germany liberalised labour markets because of weak left 
electoral competition and a pro-retrenchment change in demand. The French 
government re-regulated labour markets because of strong left electoral 
competition and an absence of demand change. 
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4.1 Changing policy-supply meets shifting policy-demand 
The following will set out the workhorse model for the empirical 
investigation of the research hypothesis and acknowledge possible limitations 
of my theory. 
On the policy supply side, Kitschelt (2001: 273-282) identifies four criteria 
under which welfare state retrenchment is politically feasible: (1) low 
credibility of the other welfare party in terms of defending welfare spending, 
(2) low electoral trade-offs because of weak competition on the left, (3) party 
organisation allowing for strategic flexibility and (4) salience of the socio-
economic dimension for party competition. 
If we apply this framework to Germany and France, we discover three 
similarities: (1) both conservative welfare state parties (CDU/RPR) have 
retrenched the welfare state in their previous spell in government, (2) strong 
party leadership in both SPD and PS is theoretically able to pursue office-
seeking strategies against the party base (Schumacher 2012), and (3) the socio-
economic dimension is of high salience in both countries (Bélanger 2006, 
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2012). If Kitschelt is right, then the remaining 
criterion of left-wing party competition can account for the policy variation. 
In order to locate social democratic parties and their competitors in the 
landscape of party competition, Kitschelt (1994) draws on expert survey data 
collected by Laver and Hunt (1992), which dates back to the late 1980s. To my 
knowledge, there is no update of this work with recent data. That is why we 
have decided to perform it myself. The raw data stems from the Chapel Hill 
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Expert Survey12. Expert surveys are considered as a reliable tool to estimate 
the parties' spatial positioning (Benoit and Laver 2006: 58). 
On the policy demand side, we expect welfare state retrenchment to become 
more likely when the overall public turns more favourably to reform. To find 
evidence for this hypothesis, we examine data from the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP 1996) on the role of government. This analysis is 
supplemented by an assessment of the electoral impact of this policy demand 
shift in terms of its distributional consequences for the different parties, using 
data form the German General Social Survey (GGSS 2012). 
The model has three possible limitations. First, it is subject to the general 
caveats of rational choice theories. Kitschelt (1994: 32) acknowledges that 
“office-maximising strategies or oligopolistic competition are not rational 
strategies per se, but depend on circumstances that make pursuing such 
objectives feasible.” Each strategy entails complex calculations of advantages 
and disadvantages which are easier to rationalise ex-post than ex-ante (Hassel 
and Schiller 2010: 146). Assuming party leaders to take decisions on the basis 
of perfect cost-benefit analysis stretches rational choice theory to its limits. 
Second, this approach cannot claim to produce hard numbers to determine 
which strategy is likely to prevail. On the policy-supply side, it cannot 
estimate an absolute threshold of electoral competition on the left, above 
which labour market liberalisation is unthinkable. Similarly, it is unable to 
calculate a minimum policy demand shift for successful reforms. What this 
paper can safely demonstrate, however, is that certain electoral strategies 
make sense in a particular setting, while others do not. Rather than discarding 
micro-theories, this paper sets a framework in which these theories operate. 
                                                        
12The dataset is available at http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/data_pp.php 
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Third, the model is rooted in the party competition literature. By definition, it 
touches only at the margins on institutionalist (Scharpf 1988, Tsebelis 2002, 
Schmidt 2002)13 or industrial relations approaches (Baccaro and Simoni 2010). 
Yet, the model of party competition works regardless of the electoral system 
(proportional representation in Germany vs. majoritarian voting in France), 
because parties were found to adopt similar strategies across electoral systems 
(Schumacher 2011: chapter 3 and 4). Within partisanship theory, this model is 
built on what we call the "it's the economy, stupid" assumption, i.e. the 
economic left-right axis is of high salience for the electoral decisions (see 
Kitschelt 2001). This necessary operationalization discards other potentially 
important electoral issues like foreign or immigration policy. Yet, polls in 
Germany and France show that unemployment and the state of the economy 
topped the list of the most salient electoral topics (Bélanger 2006, 
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2012). For a generalisation of my argument, a 
systematic testing of this working hypothesis is necessary. 
 
4.2 The supply-side: Comparing the political spaces of party competition 
The following section will map out the political space of party competition for 
both Germany and France. The results confirm the hypothesis of weak left 
competition in Germany and high left fragmentation in France. 
 
 
 
                                                        
13Note that the German reforms happened against all institutionalist odds of joint decision traps 
(Scharpf) or veto-players (Tsebelis, Schmidt) blocking reform, so this is not an arbitrary choice. 
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Figure 4: Political space in Germany in 2002 
 
Source: author's calculations, data from CHES 
Figure 4 shows the political space of German party competition prior to the 
Hartz reforms. Each party is located according to its mean scores on an 
economic left/right and libertarian/authoritarian scale.14 The estimated 
regression line represents Kitschelt's new competitive axis, weighted 
according to the electoral results of the 1998 general elections.15  The figure 
also displays the population mean which approximates the position of the 
median voter towards whom we expect the SPD to shift.16 What does this 
figure tell us? Prior to 1999, the SPD has accomplished the shift towards the 
new main axis of voter distribution as predicted by Kitschelt. Now, in 2002, 
the party faced two strategic options: either to pivot toward the centre or shift 
                                                        
14Note that the libertarian/authoritarian scale has been inversed, to mirror Kitschelt's (1994: 32) 
framework developed in figure Fehler: Referenz nicht gefunden. 
15The results are statistically significant at the p<0.01 level and reported, as the electoral results 
used for the weighting, in the annex. 
16The population mean is calculated as the mean of all parties' positions, weighted by their vote 
share. 
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to the left. Recall that the feasibility of each strategy depends on the particular 
circumstances of the domestic political space. 
Figure 5: Political space in Germany in 2002, with party weights 
 
Source: author's calculations, data from CHES 
Figure 5 also shows the German political space in 2002. Parties are visualised 
according to their electoral results, i.e. larger circles represent a higher share 
of the votes. 
We see only weak electoral competition to the left of the SPD. Only 4% of the 
voters in 1998 cast a ballot for a party to the left of the left.17 The PDS  - now 
the Linkspartei - was at the time not taken as a serious challenger, as the party 
was still exclusively rooted in East Germany and performed very poorly in 
the West (Picot 2009: 169). Hence, the SPD had reasons to believe that the 
pivot was safe, establishing itself as linchpin for any coalition. 
                                                        
17See the electoral results in the annex. 
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This intuition is confirmed through a more formal analysis of left-wing party 
fragmentation. The Rae-index (Rae 1967) provides an easily comparable 
measure of party fragmentation on a 0-1 scale, which we adapted to capture 
only left party competition.18 The closer to one, the stronger the competition 
on the economic left. Though criticised for its excessive simplicity (Rozenas 
2012), it remains with the similar "effective number of parties" index (Laakso 
and Taagepera 1979), the standard measure for party fragmentation. As figure 
6 shows, the German left-wing party spectrum is considerably less fractured 
than the French, which made it for the SPD much easier to pivot to the centre. 
Figure 6: Rae-index of left party fragmentation 
 
Source: author's calculation, data from CHES 
                                                        
18 ; where  denotes the vote (in %) for the different left parties (economic 
left-right index < 5) . The sum of all left parties squared proportion of votes is subtracted from 
the total share of left parties.  For a better cross-country comparison, the results are rescaled (0-
1):   
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Centripetal pivoting holds particular appeal in the coalition-based19 German 
political system. If close to the median voter, the SPD wields broad attraction 
to two kingmakers in the system: both the FDP on the libertarian axis and the 
Greens on the economic axis are potential coalition partners. A grand coalition 
with the CDU is equally imaginable, be it as the junior partner as in 2005-
2009. Finally, the Linkspartei has little choice but to seek an alliance with the 
SPD if it wants to hold executive power. 
What is more, Kitschelt (2001: 295) noted that if the CDU "moves to the 
market-liberal right, then the new red-green coalition enjoys more leeway to 
enact retrenchment without having to fear that dissatisfied voters will turn to 
the main opposition party." This was the case in the late 1990s, as the CDU 
drifted to the right (Picot 2012: 121). Hence, Hassel and Schiller (2010: 161) 
argue the SPD leadership was convinced that centripetal pivoting would 
increase their chances of holding executive office. In the light of the complex 
cost-benefit analysis, the lost elections in 2009 cannot be held as absolute 
evidence to the contrary. 
Analogous to the German case study, Figure 7 below shows the political space 
of French party competition shortly before the implementation of the Aubry 
laws. The regression line is weighted according to the results of the first 
round of the 1997 legislative elections.20 The French political spectrum fits 
neatly Kitschelt's prediction of shifting electoral cleavages. Having moved 
towards, even overshot, the new main axis of party competition, the PS faced 
two strategic options: either to pivot to the centre or shift to the left. Recall 
                                                        
19Note the flexibility in coalition-building across ideological divides in Germany, as opposed to 
the polarized French system, where coalitions are usually formed within a political camp. For 
instance, a social democratic-liberal coalition has governed under Chancellor Schmidt in the 
1970s. 
20The results are significant at the p<0.01 level and reported, as the electoral results used for the 
weighting, in the annexe. The first round results were chosen because – contrary to the second 
round -  they reflect more adequately the full political spectrum. 
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that the feasibility of each strategy depends on the particular circumstances of 
the domestic political space. 
Figure 7: Political space in France in 1999 
 
Source: author's calculations, data from CHES 
To illustrate this point, let us turn to figure 8, supplementing the spatial 
mapping with the scores of the parties in the first round of the 1997 legislative 
elections. 
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Figure 8: Political space in France in 1999, with party weights 
 
Source: author's calculations, data from CHES 
In France, parties on the left of the PS have traditionally captured an 
important part of the electorate. In the 1997 general elections, 15% of the votes 
were located to the far left. What is more, the PS itself is deeply divided into 
several internal factions, some of them firmly rooted to the far-left of the 
political spectrum (Goldhammer and Ross 2011: 158). This leaves for the PS 
hardly any margin to move towards the centre (Laver et al. 2006). Put more 
formally, the Rae-index of left-party fragmentation is considerably higher in 
France than in Germany (see Figure 6 above). 
Also, the French electoral system of two-round voting might give further 
incentives for oligopolistic competition. In the first round, parties play to their 
own constituents, while moving in the second round towards the centre. The 
presidential bid of the socialist Lionel Jospin in 2002 illustrates the danger of 
premature centripetal competition for the French PS. Jospin failed to qualify 
for the second round because his move to the centre triggered the success of 
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left-wing splinter candidates (Laver et al. 2006: 670). Hence, the dominant 
strategy for the PS in 1999 is oligopolistic competition: first quashing other 
left-wing parties, before moving to centre. 
 
4.3 The demand-side: The shrinking majority of welfare state defenders 
If the decision for the SPD to pivot toward the centre was straightforward, as 
the analysis of the 2002 German party competition space seems to suggest, it 
is fair to ask why it has not occurred earlier. After all, what was right in the 
second term of the Schröder government can surely not have been wrong in 
its first term? This intuition is confirmed when analysing the German political 
space in 1999 which looks broadly similar to the one in 2002. 
Figure 9: Political space in Germany in 1999 
 
Source: author's calculations, data from CHES 
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If there was already a permissive political space in 1999 there must have been 
a catalyst to unleash the reform dynamics. This trigger was a further shift in 
policy demand. 
Conventional wisdom says that social policies are universally popular, which 
renders welfare state retrenchment politically hazardous. But what if we 
submit this assumption to empirical testing? 
Table 2: Social policy preferences in Germany 
Social policy preferences (in %) 1994 2000 2004 
reduce 9.8 20.2 23.2 
sustain 53.4 53.7 55.1 
expand 36.7 26.1 21.7 
Source: Adapted from Picot (2012:116) 
While in 1994 an overwhelming majority of 90% wanted either to expand or 
sustain the welfare state, the percentage has dropped in 2004 to 75%. 
Admittedly, this was still a large majority. Yet, it is worth looking beyond the 
aggregate numbers to discover two interesting issues. First, the share of 
respondents advocating an expansion of the welfare state fell even further 
from 36.7 to 21.7%. Second, and more interestingly, what does this shift entail 
for the system of party competition? In order get an idea of the distributional 
effects, Picot (2012: 118) suggests to compare the share of party supporters in 
each of the preference groups (reduce/sustain/expand) with the overall party 
support. This technique allows estimating a party's voter potential among 
different social policy preference groups.21 
                                                        
21 ,  where denotes the party preferences within each welfare state preference group. 
The party preference share in the whole electorate is subtracted from the party preference share 
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Table 3: Social policy and party preferences in Germany 
 CDU/CSU SPD FDP Greens PDS 
Reduce      
1994 57 -35.9 29.4 -50.2 -100 
2000 33.3 -29.1 114.4 -33.8 -67.6 
2004 33.3 -22.7 82.6 -28.2 -51.8 
Sustain      
1994 10 -0,7 9.9 1 -63.8 
2000 4.7 7.4 -19.3 15.1 -24.5 
2004 -6.4 18.4 -20.3 23.7 -3.5 
Expand      
1994 -35.3 8.1 1.8 29.6 141 
2000 -32.3 5.9 -23.5 0.3 98.4 
2004 -24.5 -1.8 -9.5 -19.1 96.4 
Key: The SPD had in 1994 8.1% more prospective voters among respondents 
favouring social policy expansion compared to the total electorate 
Source: Adapted from Picot (2012: 119) 
 
Prior to the reforms in 2000, the SPD only had a larger voter reservoir 
compared to the CDU among respondents favouring a welfare state 
expansion. Yet, this group was shrinking in numbers and will continue doing 
so in the future. Among the crucial, because rising group advocating welfare 
state retrenchment, the SPD trailed its main opponent by 65%. Hence, the 
demand shift "disproportionally favoured the Christian Democrats as well as 
the Liberals and disadvantaged the Social Democrats" (Picot 2012: 118). To 
rephrase the new left's catchphrase: "to liberalise or to die", this was the 
question for Germans social democrats. The SPD went for the former. 
                                                                                                                                                              
within a social policy group. The results are divided by the party preference share in the overall 
electorate. 
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France is an interesting test case to isolate the respective effects of supply and 
demand-side on reform outcomes. As discussed above, the French political 
landscape makes it unlikely for the PS to engage in major labour market 
reforms. But what about the demand-side? If there was demand for labour 
market reform, then we can infer that supply-side obstacles outweigh 
demand-side incentives. If policy-demand was equally missing, then we can 
at least conclude that liberal labour market reforms enacted by the PS remain 
unlikely any time soon. 
Concerning public attitudes towards social policy (ISSP 1996), French voters 
were far more likely than Germans to fully agree with the statement that 
governments should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed. 
Also, true to the French dirigiste tradition, half of French respondents agreed 
that the government should control wages by law compared to 27% in 
Germany. Finally, French workers consider labour law, as opposed to 
collective agreements negotiated between social partners, as their main source 
of economic security (Bonoli 2000: 437). Against this backdrop, any labour 
market reform would need to contend with strong public opposition. No 
significant shift in favour of labour market reform has occurred. 
Therefore, we conclude that both the labour market policy supply and 
demand-side were hostile to social democratic labour market reform in 
France. This finding calls for further research to isolate the respective impact 
of labour market policy supply and demand. 
This section has argued that the counter-intuitive labour markets reforms in 
Germany can be traced back to a strategic shift in social democratic labour 
market policy supply and changing labour market policy demand. Both 
conditions were missing in France. The following section will attempt a 
generalisation of this argument. 
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V. Generalisation of the argument 
This last section suggests looking beyond the reforms in Germany and France 
and contemplating the wider picture of social democratic labour market 
reform in Europe. Are the partisan dynamics described above only valid for 
Germany and France, or do they wield some broader explanatory power for 
social democratic labour market reform in other countries at different points 
in time? Briefly discussing labour market reform in the Netherlands and 
Denmark, we will point out possible generalisations and limitations of my 
theory (see also Green-Pedersen 2001). 
 
5.1 Labour market reform in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the coalition led by the social democratic PvdA 
implemented during its two terms from 1994-2002 significant labour market 
reforms (Vis 2010: 187). Amongst other measures, unemployment benefits 
were cut, eligibility rules tightened and the definition of a "suitable job" 
widened. Also, EPL for regular contracts was slightly lowered and temporary 
work rendered more flexible (Vis 2010: 188). 
If we look at the spatial mapping of the political space in the Netherlands in 
1999, it seems to run counter the argument of left-party competition (see 
figure 10). Indeed, the social democratic PvdA faced with the progressive D66 
and the GreenLeft credible electoral competition on the left. In the 1994 
general elections, D66 took 15.4% and GL 3.4% of the vote. Therefore, there 
are a 18.8% of votes left of the PvdA, which we had expected to make a pivot 
towards the centre unlikely. 
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Figure 10: Political space in the Netherlands in 1999 
 
Source: author's calculations, data from CHES 
The Rae-index reveals a significantly higher degree of left-party 
fragmentation than in Germany, though still much lower than in France. 
Figure 11: Rae-index of left party fragmentation II 
 
Source: author's calculations, data from CHES 
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Yet, the story does not end here. Besides the PvdA and the conservative-
liberal VVD, D66 entered the coalition government, taking notably the 
ministry of economic affairs. Hence, the social democrats could bind in their 
main opponents on the left and the right which had to take responsibility for 
the welfare state retrenchment. In the 1999 general elections, the only 
remaining left-wing opposition party GL boosted its vote share to 7.3%, as 
predicted by the model. D66 was punished by the voters losing 6%, while the 
PvdA gained 5%. This analysis suggests that the coalition configuration is a 
potentially significant intervening variable which deserves further empirical 
research in the vein of Kitschelt (2001). 
The fact that social democrats were able to reform labour markets without 
losing popular support suggests they were in phase with the labour market 
demand of the wider electorate (Bonoli 2000: 432). 
5.2 Labour market reform in Denmark 
In Denmark, the Nyrup Rasmussen IV cabinet implemented from 1998-2001 
several liberal labour market reforms. Most notably, it lowered the average 
replacement rates of unemployment insurance and limited their maximum 
duration (Vis 2010: 185). 
The plotting of the political space reveals strong electoral competition to the 
left of the governing social democrats (SD). Yet, one of the parties to the left of 
the social democrats, Radical Venstre (RV), entered a coalition government 
with the social democrats and was therefore neutralised in the party 
competition. The left-wing parties remaining in opposition, the Socialist 
People's Party (SF/7.6%) and the Red-Green Alliance (EL/2.7%), scored 
together 10.3%. Therefore, there is a significant share of voters located on the 
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far left. Also, the Socialists People's Party is a credible competitor to poach 
disappointed voters of the social democrats (see figure 12). 
Figure 12: Political space in Denmark in 1999 
 
Source: author's calculations, data from CHES 
 This finding is in apparent contradiction with the theory of left party 
competition. Yet, the campaign focussed less on economic policies than on the 
so-dubbed immigration crisis (Qvortrup 2002: 205). Thus it seems as if the 
working hypothesis of a high salience of the socio-economic axis on electoral 
behaviour did not hold true in Denmark. 
In terms of labour market policy demand, the main conservative opposition 
party, Venstre (V), embraced the defence of the welfare state (Qvtrup 2002: 
205). This suggests that there has not been a significant shift in public opinion 
in favour of welfare state retrenchment. 
Hence, the Danish case indicates that labour market reform can happen on the 
basis of party competition without a supplementary nudge of a demand shift. 
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This finding calls for further research to determine under which conditions 
policy supply incentives can overcome policy demand obstacles. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to explain the counter-intuitive labour market liberalisation 
in Germany. We argued that the reforms happened because the SPD changed 
its electoral strategy for two reasons. First, it sought to maximise its office 
pay-offs in the permissive context of weak left competition in the German 
political landscape. Second, it responded to changing attitudes towards 
labour market policies within crucial segments of the German electorate. 
While the model of party competition developed in this paper does a good job 
of explaining labour market reform in Germany and France and worked 
satisfactorily when extended to Denmark and the Netherlands, two 
shortcomings have become apparent. First, the Dutch example drew attention 
to coalition-building dynamics, which add a further dimension to my basic 
party competition model. Second, voters may care less about the economy 
than other electoral issues. In the case of the Danish general elections in 2001, 
the authoritarian/libertarian axis trumped the economic left-right axis. 
Sometimes, random events like natural catastrophes dominate the campaign 
and mute other issues, for example the floods in East Germany before the 
2002 election. This is why a generalisation of the argument developed here is 
contingent on a high electoral salience of economic issues. 
The findings of this paper matter for two reasons. In terms of its contribution 
to the literature, this paper has argued to move beyond static and hybrid 
models of partisanship. To my mind, these models wrongly postulate that 
social democratic parties are ultimately motivated by policy-seeking, that is 
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furthering the interests of their traditional constituents. This potential flaw is 
increasingly recognised in the literature (Häusermann et al. 2013). Instead, 
this link should be left to empirical verification. If tested, it appears that social 
democratic parties pursue more complex and versatile strategies. This is why 
promising new theories adopt a dynamic approach to partisan politics, giving 
more room to the political (Vis 2010) and wider social context (Häusermann 
2010) in which these reforms are shaped. 
Finally, the implications of these findings can partly account for the 
unfreezing of the European welfare state. In contrast to mainstream theories 
elaborating on political gridlock (Pierson 2001b), this paper has developed an 
electorally motivated account for labour market reforms. Political spaces 
between countries vary, as do the objectives and electoral strategies of 
different social democratic parties, not to mention the actual preferences of 
voters. If social democratic governments liberalise labour markets, it is not 
because there is no alternative; it is because they strategically decide to do so.  
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: Decline of the German Model? (New York N.Y.: Berghahn Books). 
Levy, Jonah D. (2001), 'Partisan politics and welfare adjustment: the case of France', Journal of 
European Public Policy, 8 (2), 265-85. 
Malo, Miguel A., Toharia, Luis, and Gautié, Jerôme (2000), 'France: The Deregulation That Never 
Existed', in Gosta Esping-Andersen and Marino Regini (eds.), Why Deregulate Labour 
Markets? (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies (Paris: OECD Publishing). 
--- (2004), 'OECD Employment Outlook', 
<http://www.oecd.org/els/employmentpoliciesanddata/oecdemploymentoutlook2004.htm
>, accessed July, 24. 
--- (2012), 'Labour market indicators', <http://stats.oecd.org/>, accessed July, 07. 
Patrick Lunz 
49   
 
Olson, Mancur (1982), The rise and decline of nations : economic growth, stagflation, and social 
rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press). 
Palier, Bruno (ed.), (2010), A Long Goodbye to Bismarck? : The Politics of Welfare Reforms in 
Continental Europe (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press). 
Palier, Bruno and Thelen, Kathleen (2010), 'Institutionalizing Dualism: Complementarities and 
Change in France and Germany', Politics & Society, 38 (1), 119-48. 
Picot, Georg (2009), 'Party Competition and Reforms of Unemployment Benefits in Germany: 
How a Small Change in Electoral Demand Can Make a Big Difference', German Politics, 18 (2), 
155-79. 
--- (2012), Politics of segmentation : party competition and social protection in Europe 
(Abingdon: Routledge). 
Pierson, Paul (1994), Dismantling the Welfare State: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of 
Retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
--- (1996), 'The New Politics of the Welfare State ', World Politics 48 (2), 143-79. 
--- (2001a), 'Coping With Permanent Austerity Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent 
Democracies', in Paul Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
--- (ed.), (2001b), The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Pontusson, Jonas and Rueda, David (2010), 'The Politics of Inequality: Voter Mobilization and Left 
Parties in Advanced Industrial States', Comparative Political Studies, 43 (6), 675-705. 
Pontusson, Jonas, Rueda, David, and Way, Christopher R. (2002), 'Comparative Political Economy 
of Wage Distribution: The Role of Partisanship and Labour Market Institutions', British 
Journal of Political Science, 32 (2), 281-308. 
Qvortrup, Mads (2002), 'The Emperor's New Clothes: The Danish General Election 20 November 
2001', West European Politics, 25 (2), 205-11. 
Rae, D. (1967), The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press). 
Roger, Muriel, Bloch-London, Catherine, and Askenazy, Philippe (2004), 'La réduction du temps 
de travail 1997-2003 : dynamique de construction des lois « Aubry » et premières 
évaluations', Economie et statistique,  (376), 153-71. 
Rozenas, Arturas (2012), 'A Statistical Model for Party-Systems Analysis', Political Analysis, 20 
(2), 235-47. 
Rueda, David (2006), 'Social Democracy and Active Labour-Market Policies: Insiders, Outsiders 
and the Politics of Employment Promotion', British Journal of Political Science, 36 (03), 385-
406. 
--- (2007), Social democracy inside out : partisanship and labor market policy in industrialized 
democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1988), 'The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and 
European Integration', Public Administration, 66 (3), 239-78. 
--- (1991), Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca N.Y: Cornell University Press). 
What's left of the left? 
  50
Schmidt, Vivianne (2000), 'Politics, values and the power of discourse in the reform of welfare 
and work', in Fritz W. Scharpf and Vivianne Schmidt (eds.), Welfare and Work in the Open 
Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Schmidt, M.G. (2002), 'Germany: The Grand Coalition State', in J.M. Colomer (ed.), Political 
Institutions in Europe (London). 
Schröder, Gerhard (2003), 'Modernise or Die', 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/jul/08/eu.policy>, accessed August, 8. 
Schröder, Gerhard and Blair, Tony (1999), 'Der Weg nach Vorne für Europas Sozialdemokraten. 
Ein Vorschlag', Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik, 44, 887-96. 
Schumacher, Gijs (2011), '“Modernize or Die”? Social Democrats, Welfare State Retrenchment 
and the Choice between Office and Policy', (Vrije Universiteit). 
Schumacher, Gijs (2012), '‘Marx’ or the Market? Intra-party Power and Social Democratic Welfare 
State Retrenchment', West European Politics, 35 (5), 1024-43. 
Schumacher, Gijs and Vis, Barbara (2012), 'Why Do Social Democrats Retrench the Welfare State? 
A Simulation', Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 15 (3), 4. 
Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin and Fleckenstein, Timo (2007), 'Discourse, Learning and Welfare State 
Change: The Case of German Labour Market Reforms', Social Policy & Administration, 41 (5), 
427-48. 
Sénat (2011), 'Coût des 35 heures pour les finances publiques', 
<http://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2011/qSEQ110217120.html>, accessed July, 10, 
2012. 
Simoni, Marco (2013), 'The Left and Organized Labor in Low-Inflation Times', World Politics, 65 
(02), 314-49. 
Soskice, David W., Pontusson, Jonas, and Iversen, Torben (2000), Unions, Employers, and Central 
Banks : Macroeconomic Coordination and Institutional Change in Social Market Economies 
(Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press). 
Stiller, Sabina (2010), Ideational Leadership in German Welfare State Reform: How Politicians 
and Policy Ideas Transform Resilient Institutions (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press). 
Tsebelis, George. (2002), Veto players : how political institutions work (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation). 
Vis, Barbara (2010), Politics of risk-taking : welfare state reform in advanced democracies 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press).. 
 
 
 
 
Patrick Lunz 
51   
 
List of figures 
Figure 1: The competitive space for social democracy ......................................... 13 
Figure 2: EPL in Germany 1998-2005 ...................................................................... 18 
Figure 3: EPL in France 1997-2002 ........................................................................... 20 
Figure 4: Political space in Germany in 2002 ......................................................... 30 
Figure 5: Political space in Germany in 2002, with party weights ...................... 31 
Figure 6: Rae-index of left party fragmentation .................................................... 32 
Figure 7: Political space in France in 1999 .............................................................. 34 
Figure 8: Political space in France in 1999, with party weights ........................... 35 
Figure 9: Political space in Germany in 1999 ......................................................... 36 
Figure 10: Political space in the Netherlands in 1999............................................ 41 
Figure 11: Rae-index of left party fragmentation II ............................................... 41 
Figure 12: Political space in Denmark in 1999 ....................................................... 43 
 
List of tables 
Table 1: Overview of Hartz reforms ........................................................................ 17 
Table 2: Social policy preferences in Germany ...................................................... 37 
Table 3: Social policy and party preferences in Germany .................................... 38 
 
 
 
What's left of the left? 
  52
Abbreviations 
ALG II Arbeitslosengeld II (unemployment benefits II) 
ALMP Active Labour Market Policies 
CHES Chapel Hill Experts Survey 
EPL Employment Protection Legislation 
MEDEF Mouvement des Entreprises de France (French Employer 
Federation) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
TINA There is no Alternative 
 
Index of parties 
Denmark  
DF Danish People's Party 
EL Red-Green Alliance 
FP Progress Party 
KRF Christian Democratic Party 
RV Danish Social Liberal Party 
SD Social Democrats 
SF Socialist People's Party 
 
France 
 
DL Liberal Democrats 
FN National Front 
LO-LCR Revolutionary Communist League 
MDC Citizens' Movement 
PC French Communist Party 
PRG Radical Party of the Left 
PS Socialist Party 
RPF Rally for France 
RPR Rally for the Republic 
UDF Union for French Democracy 
V Greens 
Patrick Lunz 
53   
 
Germany  
CDU Christian Democratic Union 
CSU Christian Social Union of Bavaria 
FDP Free Democratic Party 
Grünen Greens 
PDS Party of Democratic Socialism 
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany 
  
The Netherlands  
CDA Christian Democratic Appeal 
D66 Democrats 66 
GL GreenLeft 
GPV Reformed Political League 
PvdA Labour Party 
SGP Reformed Political Party 
VVD People's Party for Freedom and Democracy 
 
What's left of the left? 
  54
Annex 
The data are drawn from the Chapel Hill Experts Survey database, author's 
own calculations. 
Annex, table 1: electoral results in Germany 
 
 
 
 
Annex, table 2: regression results Germany 
 
 
 
Annex, table 3: electoral results France      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patrick Lunz 
55   
 
Annex, table 4: regression results France 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What's left of the left? 
  56
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
Recent LEQS papers 
Estrin, Saul & Uvalic, Milica. ‘Foreign direct investment into transition economies: Are the Balkans 
different?’ LEQS Paper No. 64, July 2013 
Everson, Michelle & Joerges, Christian. 'Who is the Guardian for Constitutionalism in Europe after the 
Financial Crisis?' LEQS Paper No. 63, June 2013 
Meijers, Maurits. 'The Euro-crisis as a catalyst of the Europeanization of public spheres? A cross-
temporal study of the Netherlands and Germany' LEQS Paper No. 62, June 2013 
Bugaric, Bojan. 'Europe Against the Left? On Legal Limits to Progressive Politics' LEQS Paper No. 61, 
May 2013 
Somek, Alexander. 'Europe: From emancipation to empowerment' LEQS Paper No. 60, April 2013 
Kleine, Mareike. ‘Trading Control: National Chiefdoms within International Organizations’ LEQS 
Paper No. 59, March 2013 
Aranki, Ted & Macchiarelli, Corrado. 'Employment Duration and Shifts into Retirement in the EU' 
LEQS Paper No. 58, February 2013 
De Grauwe, Paul. ‘Design Failures in the Eurozone: Can they be fixed?’ LEQS Paper No. 57, February 
2013  
Teixeira, Pedro. 'The Tortuous Ways of the Market: Looking at the European Integration of Higher 
Education from an Economic Perspective' LEQS Paper No. 56, January 2013 
Costa-i-Font, Joan. ' Fiscal Federalism and European Health System Decentralization: A Perspective' 
LEQS Paper No. 55, December 2012 
Schelkle, Waltraud. 'Collapsing Worlds and Varieties of welfare capitalism: In search of a new political 
economy of welfare' LEQS Paper No. 54, November 2012 
Crescenzi, Riccardo, Pietrobelli, Carlo & Rabellotti, Roberta. ‘Innovation Drivers, Value Chains and the 
Geography of Multinational Firms in European Regions’ LEQS Paper No. 53, October 2012 
Featherstone, Kevin. 'Le choc de la nouvelle? Maastricht, déjà vu and EMU reform' LEQS Paper No. 52, 
September 2012 
Hassel, Anke & Lütz, Susanne. ‘Balancing Competition and Cooperation: The State’s New Power in 
Crisis Management’ LEQS Paper No. 51, July 2012 
Garben, Sacha. ‘The Future of Higher Education in Europe: The Case for a Stronger Base in EU Law’ 
LEQS Paper No. 50, July 2012 
Everson, Michelle. 'A Technology of Expertise: EU Financial Services Agencies' LEQS Paper No. 49, 
June 2012 
Cherrier, Nickolas. ‘EU Diplomacy at 27: United in Diversity?’ LEQS Paper No. 48, May 2012 
White, Jonathan. 'Parallel Lives: Social Comparison Across National Boundaries' LEQS Paper No. 47, 
January 2012 
 
What's left of the left? 
  58
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stuff 
 
 
 
 
LEQS 
European Institute 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE London 
Email: euroinst.LEQS@lse.ac.uk  
 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/Home.aspx   
